

FBIS/ANALYSIS GROUP

4 APRIL 1980

## MOSCOW ON SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN

Moscow domestic media do not give extensive coverage to the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan and there has been no monitored acknowledgment of Soviet involvement in the fighting there. Since the first announcement on 31 December 1979 that a "limited Soviet military contingent" was in Afghanistan at the government's request, Moscow has consistently stated that the Soviet troops would be used "exclusively" for assistance against outside aggression. Soviet listeners are aware, from a stream of news items and commentaries, of a campaign in the West linked to Afghanistan, but the media obscure what is actually happening there. Infrequent Soviet reports on the fighting depict Afghan forces as engaging "counterrevolutionaries," bandits, and terrorists. Moscow domestic service on 3 April cited Afghan President Karmal as saying the Soviet troops constitute a "reserve force," while Afghan forces are conducting military actions against "bandit formations."

Moscow has periodically denied that Soviet troops have fought rebellious Afghan army units and Afghan citizens; it has also denied Western charges that Soviet troops have used chemical warfare weapons against Afghan insurgents. There have been no monitored references to Soviet casualties; since January, three or four press obituaries of Soviet military officers said death came "in the performance of duties," but none mentioned combat or Afghanistan. Only once has a Soviet official been known to mention the casualty issue, when a CPSU Central Committee official acknowledged in a West German magazine interview in January that there had been Soviet losses "in nightly ambushes, particularly on streets," but casualties "are minimal, not even 100."

Soviet listeners are given the impression that the new regime is making steady progress building the economy and uniting the people; Soviet television has on rare occasions shown Soviet troops meeting Afghan troops or giving concerts for them, but no combat scenes have been monitored on television tapes thus far available. Infrequent descriptive reporting on the life of Soviet units in Afghanistan has covered camp life, fraternization with Afghan troops, and much-appreciated assistance to the Afghan populace in such civilian projects as bridge and machinery repair, flood relief work, and medical aid.

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## MOSCOW ON THE CORRELATION OF FORCES: A COMPILATION OF SOVIET STATEMENTS SINCE WORLD WAR II

### THE POSTWAR YEARS: 1945-1964

#### THE STALIN LEGACY

In the immediate postwar period, Soviet theoretical writings maintained that the Soviet victory over Germany in World War II and the emergence of the "world socialist system" had fundamentally altered the prewar power relationships.

Politburo member Andrey Zhdanov, at the founding conference in Warsaw of the Communist Information Bureau (COMINFORM), September 1947:

The military defeat of the bloc of fascist states and the decisive role of the Soviet Union in the victory over the fascist aggressors sharply changed the correlation of forces between the two systems--socialist and capitalist--in favor of socialism.

Central Committee Secretary Georgiy Malenkov, report to the 19th CPSU Congress in Moscow, 6 October 1952:

The present-day correlation of forces between the camp of imperialism and war and that of democracy and peace makes this prospect [the preservation of peace and the prevention of a new war] quite real.

#### THE KHRUSHCHEV YEARS

In the mid-1950's, Soviet leaders invoked the changed correlation of forces between socialism and capitalism as the ideological underpinning for a revision of the traditional doctrine that war between the two systems was inevitable. This period brought an emphasis on the economic factor in the overall correlation.

CPSU First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, report to the 20th CPSU Congress, 14 February 1956:

Whether there is to be a war or not depends in large measure on the correlation of class and political forces, the degree of organization, and the awareness and resolve of the people . . . . war is not fatalistically inevitable. Today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war.

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## USSR: SHIFTING PROPAGANDA STRATEGY ON THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

*Soviet propaganda on the United States is carefully tailored to reflect the Kremlin's expectations for bilateral dialogue. Soviet officials and propagandists have at times painted U.S. intentions in the direst terms, and at other times in remarkably optimistic terms, depending on whether Moscow believed that bilateral talks would yield agreements furthering Soviet aims. The following item is drawn from a recently completed study exploring the Kremlin's evolving propaganda strategy toward your administration since the November 1980 elections.*

The current Soviet propaganda broadside against U.S. policy contrasts starkly with Moscow's public description of your administration's intentions in the wake of the November 1980 elections. Moscow's interest in opening an immediate dialogue at that time was evident in Soviet propaganda's optimistic projections of your administration's policies and in the leadership's effort to demonstrate flexibility on SALT. Brezhnev on 17 November pledged to ignore what had been said in "the heat of the election struggle" and to respond to any "constructive steps" your administration might take. He emphasized the importance of continuing the "SALT process" but ignored the SALT II treaty. At the same time, Soviet propaganda claimed that you had become increasingly "moderate" during the election campaign and that you were giving "foremost priority" to an improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations.

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Following your inauguration, Moscow's posture entered a period of flux. Soviet officials mixed sharp attacks on your administration's criticism of Soviet policy with suggestions that U.S. policy might still prove to be more accommodating. In a major address to the Soviet party congress at the end of February, Brezhnev rebuked your administration for making statements that seem "intended to poison" bilateral relations but he expressed hope that U.S. policymakers would ultimately "look at things more realistically." Following the party congress, Soviet foreign policy spokesmen disagreed openly on whether definitive conclusions could yet be drawn about your administration's foreign policy course.

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Moscow's shift to a decidedly pessimistic public posture on your administration was signaled in Brezhnev's 9 May speech. In this speech, Brezhnev placed your administration in the camp of those Western statesmen who regard military superiority over the USSR as their "main political credo" and who reject the solution of international problems through negotiations. In the wake of Brezhnev's speech, Defense Minister Ustinov and other Soviet officials have accused your administration of returning to the cold war and breaking off the SALT process.

Moscow's shifting views of your administration coincided with its increasing hopes that West European doubts about U.S. arms control policy could scuttle NATO deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles.

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Since mid-May, Moscow has launched a major propaganda campaign designed to foster the belief that U.S. expressions of readiness for talks on LRTNF are "camouflage" for an unprecedented military buildup. In a June speech, Brezhnev claimed that the United States has made no move toward talks and accused your administration of "trying to lull its allies and public opinion." Soviet propaganda quickly seized on the U.S. decision to produce the Enhanced Radiation Warhead as grist for the effort to encourage doubts about your administration's commitment to arms control.

Judging from its tactics under previous administrations, Moscow's harsh rhetoric about U.S. intentions on arms control is likely to continue until bilateral talks on strategic arms ~~control~~ begin to show signs of substantive progress. ✓

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17 MAY 1983

## SIGNIFICANT SOVIET STATEMENTS ON INF, 12-18 MAY 1983

Soviet statements on INF during the week were keyed to the scheduled resumption of talks in Geneva on 17 May. Press commentary highlighted Andropov's latest initiative--the agreement to equal numbers of warheads as well as delivery vehicles he announced in a 3 May Kremlin speech--and sought to justify Soviet insistence on including British and French warheads in the count. Moscow continues to imply that an agreement is possible this year if the United States responds appropriately to Soviet initiatives. Aleksandr Bovin, a reported adviser to Andropov, made a rare allusion to the increase in Soviet warheads that would be allowed under the new Andropov initiative if Britain and France were to proceed with planned INF modernization programs.

PRAVDA editorial article, 13 May 1983:

The reaction of the West to the new Soviet peace initiative is rather mixed. It has no choice but to admit that the Soviet Union, trying to break the deadlock at the talks, has taken another major step and to pledge that the Soviet proposals will be carefully studied. But these are words for public consumption, said most probably just to delude the gullible. The essence of the U.S. and NATO approach, regrettably, remains the same. . . .

Those who would say "no" in response to the new Soviet initiative and continue to sabotage the Geneva talks would assume grave responsibility for all the consequences. If it comes to the actual deployment of American Pershings and cruise missiles in West Europe, the chain reaction would become inevitable. The measures the USSR and the other Warsaw treaty countries would take in response would be effective. No one should have any illusions on this score.

USSR INF delegation head Kvitsinskiy, Geneva arrival statement, TASS, 14 May 1983:

The situation at the talks is known to remain unnormal. America's "zero option" obstructed any progress for one and a half years. The so-called "interim offer" made by the United States not so long ago does not mean any positive change in the U.S. stand, as its aim is to deploy new U.S. missiles in West Europe and to make the Soviet Union reduce its arms unilaterally. Of course, the Soviet Union will never agree to such an unjust solution, which contradicts the interests of European nations.

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PRAVDA signed commentary, 15 May 1983:

Is there a chance for reaching Soviet-American accords on key issues of stopping the arms race? Yes, there is an objective basis for this, the newspaper stresses. It has been created, above all, by concrete, realistic proposals of the USSR which take into account the vital interests of all countries and peoples. This basis is being created by powerful demonstrations of the masses against the threat of nuclear war sweeping all countries and continents. . . . Everything now depends on the political will and readiness of countries for cooperation. The USSR has such will and readiness. It is up to the United States and its NATO allies now.

Political observer Aleksandr Bovin, IZVESTIYA 17 May 1983:

Let us suppose our proposal is accepted, the Eurostrategic potentials of the USSR and NATO are made equal. What next? If Britain and France reduce the number of delivery vehicles and warheads the USSR will naturally do this too. But Britain and France have pretty hefty programs for the modernization and development of their nuclear missile forces. Let us assume France replaces one single-unit S-3 ground-based missile with an S-4 missile with seven warheads. Or Britain replaces the submarine-based Polaris A-3 missiles with Polaris A-3TK missiles which have six warheads. Obviously the Soviet Union would have every right to increase its own capability accordingly. Thus France and Britain would be the initiators of an arms race in Europe with all the ensuing moral and political consequences.